debates{history || Blackout History Project

Interview Part I: Notes

Time: hour,min,sec	Topic Discussed
00:00	Introductions
06:15	How did your training prepare, or not prepare, you for the blackout?
07:55	If we were in the control room on that day, there wouldn't have been a blackout
09:39	We probably didn't get fired because…we were the only two who knew what we were doing...
10:40	Studied restoration for months - there was no better way to restore (than what they did)
11:15	Did the Blackout make you better engineers?
13:15	What were the critical developments?
24:45	When did the two of you get involved?
26:00	No one was doing anything...operator was in a state of shock
26:20	Why didn't load shedding work?
29:00	Load shedding didn't work because the operator switched too fast - switches had a 3-7 second delay that no one knew about
30:30	Control center was not designed by operators but by engineers
32:00	New control center design - to avoid human error, Con Ed used Lockheed and Boeing as contractors because of their experience in aircraft cockpit design
38:00	When did you come up with a restoration plan? - we made it up on the fly
41:45	Almost lost control - everyone started doing their own thing
41:30	If the phones hadn't worked, the lights would still be out
51:30	When analyzing events minute-by-minute, we noticed that for a 2 -3 hour period, nothing was being energized - efforts were directed at making sure there was power at the Con Ed headquarters for a press conference
1:02:00	How have things changed since the 1977 Blackout? - management has changed - came up with emergency response procedures - expected managers to be leaders, not observer
1:03:30	In September 1977, we avoided a possible blackout similar to July 1977
1:04:30	Changes - General Manager position became a "trained" role - operators moved into this position - previously, GM's did not know how things worked
1:07:45	Other changes - no longer accepted marginal performers - some left the company, others were moved out of operator positions
1:17:15	Used an Industrial Psychologist for job definition and evaluation
1:25:30	Did your Con Ed changes move into the rest of the industry? - they did through the NY Power Pool - otherwise, Con Ed was at the mercy of other companies
1:31:00	Questions about Nuclear plants
1:33:00	Can a fail safe system be built in a deregulated environment?
1:37:00	Do you remember any operators "taking the bullet"?
1:39:00	Procedures vs. judgment calls - implemented more procedures - could make your own call ONLY if the situation did NOT match the procedural scenario

Interview Part II: Notes

Time: hour,min,sec	Topic Discussed
00:30	How did ConEd change its load shedding operation? - physically, procedurally
02:00	Prior to the blackout - what was the rule for load shedding? - it was rare - my have shed load once every 20 years?
09:45	SOCCS - new computer system took 7 years to develop - computers couldn't handle it - 400 man years of programming (received it in 1985)
11:00	"Horse and buggy" to the "starship enterprise" - no in-between steps from old to new
11:15	Contingency analysis every minute (linear analysis)
14:15	State estimator - powerful tool - didn't become "regular" equipment until late 1980's
16:45	How do I know the information from the computer is "real" - so many data points and places for error
19:20	Biggest users of computer systems in the world - electric utility industry.
19:50	Operators have complete faith in software - readings, state estimator, etc
25:00	If all the operators had worked together - would have stopped blackout - management failure
31:00	Lessons of 1977?
36:00	Implemented continuous learning
48:00	Social response in 1977 - how did it influence Cone Ed and the industry?
52:20	1977 revealed the importance of electricity in civil behavior
55:40	Expectation that lights will stay on at all times
57:50	Can't compare Con Ed with anyone else - far above every other company
1:00:40	When something fails, someone failed to do something