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This wide variation in system daily load creates a problem in the control of system voltage during both heavy and light load periods. . . .

In the U.S., the root cause of the problem has been stated, almost universally, as the insatiable demand of the American public for energy as reflected in the exponential growth of its demand, . . .

What to do: unplug, remain static, or expand?. . . .

These operations, straightforward in a planning environment, become very difficult to handle in an operating, real-life situation by virtue of the vast amount of system-derived data that must be processed. . . .

The operating policies in use today are essentially the same as those established more than 30 years ago. The formal PJM agreement contains the basic operating principles...The success of the one-system concept may be credited to the central dispatching office. . . .

Can blackouts be avoided? Probably not entirely. But it is encouraging to note that New York City experienced an initiating event on September 26, 1967, that may have been more severe. . . .

A new philosophy for the analysis and design of large electric power interconnections has evolved following the Northeast power failure of November 9, 1965. . . .

Recent technological advances in the fields of extra-high-voltage (ENV) transmission and supersized generators offer economic incentive for intersystem coordination. . . the industry is now on the threshold of another dramatic step in its integration advances. . . .

Superpools consist of a multiplicity of power pools and are the next possible step for coordinating the operation of power pool. . . .

His designs must no merely be reliable, environment-proof, and internal failure-proof; they must also be saboteur-proof, foolproof, vandal-proof, criminal-proof, and idiot-proof. . . .

Historical trends in US energy consumption, 1902-1987. . . .

In 1970, electric utilities supplied 93 percent of the electricity generated in the United Sates. . .by 1991 the electric utility's share declined to 91 percent...

This wide variation in system daily load creates a problem in the control of system voltage during both heavy and light load periods. . . .

The minimum daily load [in New York City] during the off-peak season on the system is about 20 percent of the weekday peak load. On an average day, the minimum load is about 30 percent of the peak load. This wide variation in system daily load creates a problem in the control of system voltage during both heavy and light load periods. During the former periods, about 500Mvar of switchable shunt capacitors are placed in service both for voltage control on the 4-kV feeders and to reduce the current load on high-voltage cable and substation transformers. During the lighter load periods, the capacitive megavars will far exceed the inductive megavars even though all switched capacitors are disconnected. It is during these periods that control of system voltage becomes an acute problem, requiring the special attention of “engineering and operations" to maintain stable voltage conditions at each voltage level of the system.

The full text from which this excerpt was taken is available in the archive:
IEEE Spectrum, Sept. 1966
, pg. 142.

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In the U.S., the root cause of the problem has been stated, almost universally, as the insatiable demand of the American public for energy as reflected in the exponential growth of its demand . . .

The escalating imbalance between energy supply and demand may be the most difficult and pervasive problem facing the world today. And most responsible forecasts anticipate a major aggravation of the problem in the future. In the US, the root cause of the problem has been stated, almost universally, as the insatiable demand of the American public for energy as reflected in the exponential growth of its demand. The solution, as proffered by some, is the adoption of a no-growth or limited-growth philosophy and, by others, as the conservation of end-use consumption, either voluntarily or by government edict. These tenets will be examined here together with the role of electric power, a form of energy that has been growing at nearly double the rate of total “raw” energy demand (7.2 vs. 4.4 percent annually).

The full text from which this excerpt was taken is available in the archive:
IEEE Spectrum, July 1974
, pg. 69.

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What to do: unplug, remain static, or expand?. . . .

The alternatives to the power dilemma are threefold: shut down a portion of the industrial and domestic load, put a lid on further industrial expansion, or meet the continuing demand for more energy and accept the environmental penalties.

The full text from which this excerpt was taken is available in the archive:
IEEE Spectrum, November, 1970
, pg. 50.

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These operations, straightforward in a planning environment, become very difficult to handle in an operating, real-life situation by virtue of the vast amount of system-derived data that must be processed. . . .

This planning-oriented approach to such security assessment involves two operations: gathering information about the present status of the system (the power system state estimation problem), and calculating whether the system will maintain stable operation in the face of a designated list of severe disturbances. These operations, straightforward in a planning environment, become very difficult to handle in an operating, real-life situation by virtue of the vast amount system-derived data that must be processed, the practically limitless number of contingencies (possible combinations of equipment losses) that must be considered, and the length of time needed to determine by simulation the response of the system to any one (let alone all) of these contingencies. Despite these procedural difficulties, rudimentary security assessment programs are being developed and some have been implemented.

The full text from which this excerpt was taken is available in the archive:
IEEE Spectrum, March 1978
, pg. 50.

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The operating policies in use today are essentially the same as those established more than 30 years ago. The formal PJM agreement contains the basic operating principles...The success of the one-system concept may be credited to the central dispatching office. . . .

The operating policies in use today are essentially the same as those established more than 30 years ago. The formal PJM agreement contains the basic operating principles. Maximum benefits accrue to the members because the systems are operated as though they were one system under one management. With this one-system concept, accounting procedures have been set up to allocate savings as equitably as possible to the systems that create the savings, always keeping in mind that it takes two parties to complete a transaction. However, it should be noted that the operators of the individual systems still are responsible for maintaining service continuity on their own systems.

The success of the one-system concept may be credited to the central dispatching office, which coordinates the operation and accounting for the systems. Monitoring from a central office assures coordination of the operation of thermal units, hydro units, and pumped storage units that are actually dispatched from the control centers of the various systems. Operating reserve capacity requirements are developed on an interconnection basis rather than on a system basis, resulting in appreciable savings to the systems.

The full text from which this excerpt was taken is available in the archive:
IEEE Spectrum, January, 1967
, pg. 95.

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Can blackouts be avoided? Probably not entirely. But it is encouraging to note that New York City experienced an initiating event on September 26, 1967, that may have been more severe. . . .

Can blackouts be avoided? Probably not entirely. But it is encouraging to note that New York City experienced an initiating event on September 26, 1967, that may have been more severe than the one that precipitated the July 13 blackout two months earlier, yet the system coped by shedding only 200 MW of load for one hour. No uncontrolled cascading took place.

The full text from which this excerpt was taken is available in the archive:
IEEE Spectrum, April 1978
, pg. 36.

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A new philosophy for the analysis and design of large electric power interconnections has evolved following the Northeast power failure of November 9, 1965. . . .

AA new philosophy for the analysis and design of large electric power interconnections has evolved following the Northeast power failure of November 9, 1965. Most contingencies that can cause widespread outages occur too infrequently to be included in the criteria for system design. Nevertheless, systems should he tested for combinations of events that cause system instability and separation so that the consequences of these unlikely occurrences can be evaluated and system designers can provide disaster control procedures to limit the extent and duration of system outages. The design and disaster control procedures should provide successive lines of defense against increasingly severe and unlikely events. Disaster control procedures can be coordinated so that governor action, load-shedding, and system separation can be integrated according to time and frequency in such a way that, maximum reliability and security will be provided.

The full text from which this excerpt was taken is available in the archive:
IEEE Spectrum, November, 1967
, pg. 52.

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Recent technological advances in the fields of extra-high-voltage (ENV) transmission and supersized generators offer economic incentive for intersystem coordination. . . the industry is now on the threshold of another dramatic step in its integration advances. . . .

These individual power systems, in turn, have been interconnected with their surrounding neighbors to carry out integrated planning and operations on a multisystem basis through power pooling contracts or other forms o interconnection agreements. Recent technological advances in the fields of extra-high-voltage (EHV) transmission and supersized generators offer economic incentive for intersystem coordination an even broader basis, ant the industry is now on the threshold of another dramatic step in its integration advances.

The full text from which this excerpt was taken is available in the archive:
IEEE Spectrum, April 1964
, pg. 96.

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Superpools consist of a multiplicity of power pools and are the next possible step for coordinating the operation of power pool. . . .

Power pools consist of a number of interconnected power companies that join together to produce an optimal allocation of generation subject to the security constraints of the systems. A number of formal power pools presently exist, and that number is increasing. Superpools consist of a multiplicity of power pools and are the next possible step for coordinating the operation of power pools. This article focuses upon the control of generation in such pools and superpools.

The full text from which this excerpt was taken is available in the archive:
IEEE Spectrum, March 1973
, pg. 54.

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His designs must no merely be reliable, environment-proof, and internal failue-proof; they must also be saboteur-proof, foolproof, vandal-proof, criminal-proof, and idiot-proof. . .

One can speculate on the reasons for society’s apathy in the face of physical and/or economic attacks on The System. Surely there has been a rise in consumerism, a broader application of civil disobedience, and a feeling by more segments of society that unjust or obsolete laws or regulations can be changed de facto, by simply disregarding them. Whatever the reasons, the impact on the technologist himself is clear. He must consider new constraints, occasionally even thinking the unthinkable. His designs must not merely be reliable, environment-proof, and internal failure-proof; they must also be saboteur-proof, foolproof, vandal-proof, criminal-proof, and idiot-proof. And, as in the case of any superior design, he must do his thinking and planning at the outset, or else become caught up in “fixes,” or in trying to design costly and complex auxiliary systems to protect existing plant.

The full text from which this excerpt was taken is available in the archive:
IEEE Spectrum, May 1975
, pg. 31.

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Historical Trends in U.S. Energy Consumption, 1902-1987. . . .

Figure AI.1 Historical Trends in US Energy Consumption, 1902-1987

Sources: US Bureau of Mines, as presented in Towards Project Independence: Energy in the Coming Decade, prepared for the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, US Congress, 94th, 1st sess. (December 1975); Edison Electric Institute, Historical Statistics of the Electric Utility Industry, and Statistical Yearbook of the Electric Utility Industry (Washington, D.C.: EEI, various editions); US Department of Energy, Annual Energy Review (Washington, DC:GPO, various issues).

The full text from which this excerpt was taken is available in the archive:
Electricity in the American Economy: Agent of Technological Progress, 1990
, pg. 342.

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In 1970, electric utilities supplied 93 percent of the electricity generated in the United States. . .by 1991 the electric utility's share declined to 91 percent...

In 1970, electric utilities supplied 93 percent of the electricity generated in the United States. The balance was produced by “nonutilities”—generators of electric power that are not utilities—consisting primarily of industrial manufacturers that produced electricity for their own use. The electric utility's share of electric power generation increased steadily between then and 1979, when it reached 97 percent. The trend reversed itself in the 1980's, and by 1991 the electric utility's share declined to 91 percent.

The full text from which this excerpt was taken is available on the
U.S. Energy Information Administration's web site
:
Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry: Selected Issues, 1998,
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str_issu/summary/chg_str_issu_sum.html.)

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jts{27 June 2000}